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ABSTRACT 
Inspired by the award winning paper, Are Extreme Returns on Hedge Fund Portfolios 
Problematic for Investors (Brulhart and Klein, 2006) we analyzed the nature of extreme 
returns in the Canadian hedge fund market. Although much has been written on this topic 
for US and global hedge funds, no one has studied the nature of extreme returns in the 
still developing Canadian hedge fund market before. We find that the hedge fund returns 
are generally more favourable than that of major equity and bond indices from the 
perspective of mean-variance measures. As in Brulhart and Klein (2006), the standard 
measures of skewness and kurtosis can provide misleading insight, or lead to incorrect 
conclusion about higher order risks. In his paper, we interpret the extreme return in two 
perspectives by considering the moments of higher order as well as the magnitude and 
duration of drawdown period. Last but not the least, we conduct a comparison of de-
levered returns on the various indices and find that investors should be surprised by the 
results but in a pleasant way.  
 
 
Keywords: Hedge Fund, Hedge Fund Index, Extreme Returns, Skewness, Kurtosis, 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
Hedge funds have been considered as an investment tool which has a low degree of 
exposure to broad market movement while achieving superior returns. Many studies have 
been done on the risk/return characteristics of hedge funds and traditional investments, 
showing that hedge funds investment superiors traditional investments including bond 
and equity in many ways. These have led to an increasing popularity of the hedge fund 
asset class. However, highly publicized failures of a small number of hedge funds, such 
as Askin‟s Granite Fund in 1994, Long Term Capital Management in 1998 and Amaranth 
in 2006, some hedge fund investors are probably going to step back and take a second 
thought on the extreme returns on hedge funds. 
 
The issue of extreme returns is an important one in the hedge fund industry. The award 
winning paper, Are Extreme Returns on Hedge Fund Portfolio Problematic for Investors 
by Brulhart and Klein (2006) discussed the issue of extreme returns in the US hedge fund 
market and found that they are not problematic. This finding arouses our interest to 
explore the mystery of extreme returns in the Canadian hedge fund market that no one 
has looked at before.  
 
Comparing to the US and European market, the Canadian hedge fund market is more 
recent. Also, the time series of Canadian hedge fund market has been too short. Investors 
pay less concern on Canadian hedge fund market. As a result, the Canadian hedge fund 
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market is less efficient and relatively uncrowded that many investment opportunities exist 
there. Thanks to KCS Fund Strategies Inc. that we have the private database that has up 
to 12 years data of 154 different Canadian hedge funds. We are going to have a look at 
the impacts of extreme returns in the profitable Canadian hedge fund market using the 
database. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews briefly about the literatures on 
extreme returns. Chapter 3 describes the methodologies including the moments of higher 
order, the transformation of the moments of higher order as well as the drawdown 
statistics. Chapter 4 classifies 154 different Canadian hedge funds into several groups 
according to different hedge fund strategies. The performance comparisons are done 
between different hedge fund sub-indices and Canadian equity and bond indices, namely 
TSX index and DEX index. 
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2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The top five of the most commonly used hedge fund strategies in the Canadian hedge 
fund market are the Equity L/S strategy, the Managed Futures strategy, Equity Market 
Neutral strategy, Multi-Strategy and Event Driven strategy. The description of each 
strategy is as follows: 
 
Equity L/S strategy usually constructs a portfolio that includes long holdings of 
equities and short sales of stock or stock index options. The empirical research 
indicates low leverage ratio is utilized to the equity hedge strategy. The position of 
equity hedge may be anywhere from net long position to net short position, 
depending on the market conditions. This is the most commonly used strategy in the 
Canadian hedge fund market. 
 
Managed Futures hedge funds, or Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), can 
access both financial and non-financial (commodity) markets. The funds may take 
long or short futures, options, and forward positions in any of those markets.  
 
Equity Market Neutral strategy seeks to exploit differences in stock prices by 
using the long and short strategies in stocks within the same sector, industry, market 
capitalization, country, etc.  The objective of the strategy is to create a hedge against 
market factors.  
  4 
Multi-Strategy managers engage in a variety of investment strategies including 
convertible bond arbitrage, equity long/short, statistical arbitrage and merger 
arbitrage and so on, to purse positive returns regardless of the direction of 
movements in the markets. Many benefits can be obtained by adopting Multi-
Strategy. The diversification helps to reduce volatility, smooth return streams and 
decrease asset-class and single-strategy risks.  
 
Event Driven strategy is one of hedge fund strategies in which the managers take 
significant positions in a certain number of companies with „special situations‟ 
(Investopedia.com, 2008). These special situations include distressed stocks, 
takeovers, big news stories, mergers, and the like. 
 
There are many reviews on the strategies and performance measurement during the past 
years. Gehin (2004) made an extensive survey on hedge fund performance. The paper 
discussed various biases associated with the hedge fund database as well as the 
overestimation effect of the hedge fund index due to these biases. In addition, the paper 
mentioned that the traditional performance measures are not suitable to evaluate hedge 
fund risk-return profile. Many studies in the paper provide some insights to the topic of 
this thesis.  
 
The extreme returns of hedge funds are constantly blamed for the biases associated with 
the fund database. One of the obvious reasons is that the fund database kicks out the 
underperformed fund that no longer operating as discussed in Brown, Goetzmann, 
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Ibbotson, Ross (1992). This is recognized as survivorship bias. Survivorship bias is one 
of the main reasons that cause the overestimation of hedge fund index. The consequence 
is that the hedge fund indices appear to be more attractive than equity and bond indices. 
Another notorious bias is the selection bias. Due to the limited information in hedge fund 
industry, the index constructed from the selected database tends to be different from other 
databases. Bollen and Pool (2007) found that in the hedge fund industry is that monthly 
returns are more likely to be marginally positive than zero or marginally negative, and 
fund managers have an incentive to misreport monthly returns in this way in order to 
attract investors, which brings in bias to database. 
 
Studies were conducted to estimate the true magnitude of the hedge fund index 
overestimation during the past years. However, there is no common consensus reached on 
this issue.  Liang (2000) mentioned that the overestimation is over 2% per year. In 
addition, he also noted that the bias is determined by the studied time horizon and the 
reference index. The reason why hedge funds stopped reporting is the funds reach their 
target sizes so that there is no need to attract new clients any more. Hence, Ackermann, 
McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) revealed their study to show that the bias could be just 
as low as 0.16%. However, some researchers are still challenging these results due to the 
“selection bias” of the hedge fund database.  Malkiel and Saha (2005) constructed a 
database that was relatively free of bias and reported that the returns of hedge funds are 
overstated by 4.4% per year. We think this study could be a representative of this class of 
research among the literatures. 
 
  6 
In the issue of portfolio allocation, mean return and standard deviation are the 
fundamental philosophy. However, the mean value and standard deviation are not 
sufficient to catch the real characteristics of investment returns when the return 
distribution is not symmetrical. In the paper, Brooks and Kat (2001) suggested that the 
mean-variance usually underestimate the true volatility of hedge fund returns such that 
the Sharpe ratio measurement is not an appropriate one. The investors are confused by 
the different fund rankings provided by traditional allocation tools such as Sharpe ratio, 
the Treynor ratio and Jensen‟s alpha.  The Sortino ratio developed by Frank A. Sortino 
measures the return to the real risk – the downside volatility. It seems to be useful 
because it works well under asymmetric return distribution. However, just like Sharpe 
ratio, Treynor ratio and Jensen‟s alpha, it does not consider the moments of higher order. 
Recently, Osipovs(2007) pointed out that the Sharpe ratio results show a positive 
correlation with the ranking provided by other more sophisticated performance measures. 
 
Many researchers found out that we must take the moments of higher order into 
consideration to obtain better explanations of hedge fund returns.  Amin and Kat (2002), 
Malkiel and Saha (2005) etc., suggested that negative skewness and large kurtosis of 
hedge fund returns should be considered as the hidden risks. Another related study by 
Fung and Hsieh (1999) is that the hedge fund performance looks very attracted due to the 
high mean return and low standard deviation. However, the negative skewness and high 
kurtosis need to be considered in the risk and return profiles of hedge funds.   Moreover, 
Liang and Park (2006) confirmed that the consideration of higher moments such as 
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skewness and kurtosis is helpful when explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns of hedge fund. 
  
Drawdown statistics is easy to understand by most of normal investors. However, there 
are some research issues of drawdown statistics. Lhabitant (2004) pointed out some latent 
concerns of this measure. The maximum drawdown of hedge funds depends on the 
history of time series and the frequency of the measurement interval. Perell o´ (2007) also 
proved that the Gaussian results for the studied downside risk measures are still important.  
We are going to talk about this issue in detail later in Chapter 3. 
 
When it comes to the question whether negative skewness and high kurtosis of hedge 
funds look bad to investors, Brulhart and Klein (2006) published an award winning paper 
that had a deep insight to the real magnitude of hedge fund returns. They compared the 
performance of indices, two equity indices (S&P 500 TR and Nasdaq), a bond index 
(Merrill Lynch U.S. Domestic Master Index) and two hedge fund database, under the 
same time horizon. The research results revealed that most of hedge fund indices are not 
severe as we ever thought, comparing to the two equity indices. The drawdown statistics 
also suggests that hedge funds have smaller magnitude of drawdown than that of equity 
indices. In addition, the drawdown tends to recover quickly in a couple of months. 
  
As reviewed above, we can see that there are many researches conducted on the U.S. 
hedge fund market. The interesting thing is only few studies have been done on the 
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Canadian hedge fund market, which is close to the US market geographically.  The most 
complete research on the Canadian hedge fund industry was done by the Alternative 
Investment Management Association (AIMA), which covered the hedge fund market in 
Canada, hedge fund strategies, the risk/return characteristics of hedge funds. The latest 
AIMA report, which published in 2005, revealed that the Canadian hedge fund market 
had been paid with relatively less concerns; the most commonly used strategies is Equity 
Long/Short strategy; the risk/return characteristics of hedge fund strategies differ 
substantially from each other, and from traditional bond and equity market.  
 
According to a report by Barry Cohen (2008), the structure of Canadian hedge fund can 
be best compared to a pyramid with a wide base. At the top of the pyramid, relatively few 
multi-billion dollar firms control majority of hedge fund assets. A small number of mid-
sized players that run assets ranging from C$100 million to C$600 million in the middle 
bulge. The pyramid suddenly broadens out to encompass the majority of hedge fund 
shops which are managing assets ranging from only a few million dollars to as much as 
C$100 million.  
 
Barry (2008) also talked about some point of view on the Canadian hedge fund market by 
Alex Logie, the managing partner at Crane Capital Associates. Canadian funds are much 
stronger on the long side than the short side because the managers have recently come out 
of long shops and so do not have a lot of experience of having been short. In addition, the 
rising tide in Canadian equity markets has meant that unless you are uncommonly 
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brilliant, you will dampen the volatility by being short and therefore cost yourself some 
returns.  
 
Lastly, Greg N. Gregorious (2003) is also an important one of the few papers on 
Canadian hedge fund market. In the paper, Gregorious introduced a modified Sharpe ratio 
to Canadian hedge fund performance. The modified Sharpe ratio recommends MVaR 
(Marginal Value at Risk) for measuring the extreme negative returns, which takes the 
third and the fourth moment into consideration.   
 
We believe Brulhart and Klein (2006) made a breakthrough on the explanations of hedge 
fund extreme returns. They applied the novel method to decompose skewness and 
kurtosis of hedge funds, which made the performance comparisons between equity, bond, 
and hedge fund indices possible. Here, we are going to apply similar methodologies as 
Brulhart and Klein (2006) to explore the mystery of extreme return on Canadian hedge 
fund market. 
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3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
In this chapter, we list a lot of traditional measurements of hedge fund performance. Due 
to the nature of hedge fund, the returns and risks, in some cases, are distorted somehow. 
We classify the Canadian hedge fund data into a few groups according to different hedge 
fund strategies. The mean value and standard deviation are computed for each group. In 
the cases of non-normal return distributions, we take the moments of higher order into 
account in further analysis on the true risk-return performance.      
3.1 Obtaining Data on Hedge Fund Returns 
The operation of hedge fund is naturally different from other funds, say mutual fund. 
Usually, the public investors are not able to obtain enough information to evaluate the 
performance of hedge funds. There are many reasons behind the story. Here are the most 
important ones as discussed in Lhabitant (2004): First, onshore hedge funds are privately 
organized investment vehicles. The fund managers have no incentive to disclose the past 
performance to investors. Second, due to the regulations, the fund managers are not 
allowed to advertise in any sense. As a result, the managers cannot attract potential public 
investors by disclosing the hedge fund performances that are usually favourable to 
investors comparing to other investment tools. People should not be surprised by the fact 
that many very successful hedge fund managers never disclose the fund performance. 
Third, the disclosure of performance is usually associated with investment strategies 
which are highly confidential. A fund would be in deep trouble if its executive strategies 
were exposed. Long Term Capital Management has already provided us a lesson in 1998. 
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3.2 The Construction of Indices 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, the hedge fund indices may be biased and 
subjective. Lhabitant (2004) believed that the following two are the main reasons for the 
problem:  first, the data mining process is problematic. The negative impacts of biases 
can be eradicated, but at the cost of expensive computation. Second, the managers 
manipulate the hedge fund prices such that the data does not reflect the true value of the 
fund. 
 
In U.S., there are at least fourteen financial institutions constructing hedge fund indices 
from their selected databases. The problem is that the fund rankings measured by 
different institutions can be very different even to hedge funds under same strategy. 
These serious biases associated with the hedge fund index make investors confused.  
 
The classifications of hedge fund databases are very different from each financial 
institution. Among all classifications, we personally think the one provided by Morgan 
Stanley Capital Indices (MSCI) is the most comprehensive one. The classification 
standard is shown in Table [1]. 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to construct the hedge fund sub-indices for the 
Canadian hedge fund market. The comparisons can be made between different sub-
indices first and then between sub-indices and the Canada equity and bond indices.   
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During the construction of sub-indices, the weighting to each hedge fund is apparently 
important. Our research indicates that there is only one hedge fund index provider that 
systematically uses capitalization-weighted indices.  
 
Some possible reasons are discussed as followed. First, the hedge fund indices are not in 
their mature stage yet. The common example is Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) 
index that is one of the popular equity indices. DJIA is an equal-weighted index. Some 
people believe the hedge fund indices can be adjusted as a capitalization-weighted index. 
 
Second, the determination of assets under each hedge fund is a tough mission. The assets 
managed under each hedge fund include onshore and offshore-organized vehicles. It 
could be very hard to obtain the complete information. In addition, another key factor is 
that the leverage utilized in the operation of hedge funds. Even worse, the managers 
usually adjust the leverage ratio quickly according to market conditions. 
 
Last but not the least, some people claimed that the capitalization-weighted method could 
distort the real performance of hedge fund. Nevertheless, the equal-weighted method is 
not substantially better than the capitalization-weighted method. 
3.3 The Moments of Higher Order 
In the traditional world of investment performance analysis, the mean value and variance 
are efficient when measuring the investment performance. The two primary performance 
measurement methods, CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) based measures and 
Market-Timing measures, are the most commonly used ones in equity returns analysis. In 
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general, the investors have positive preference to mean value and negative preference to 
variance. This is easy to understand, as the investors would like to maximize the returns 
given a fixed risk level, or minimize the risks given a fixed return.  
 
However, the investment returns are not always normally distributed. The empirical 
research indicates that most returns are asymmetrically distributed. The reasons why the 
returns are asymmetric are not surprised. Both the common market crashes and rallies 
contributed to the abnormal returns. This is the reason why mean and variance are not 
sufficient in reflecting performances. Thus, the consideration of the moment of high 
orders is crucial in further analysis on the risk-return characteristics of hedge funds.  
 
As we are all taught in fundamental statistics, a higher kurtosis implies that a distribution 
has extreme outliers, and a negative skewness implies extreme outliers occur to the 
downside. We suggest an investment return analyzing procedure as follows. Firstly, the 
Jacque-Bera test should be used to test the normality of returns. Secondly, if the returns 
follow a normal distribution, the traditional mean-variance measures should be sufficient 
in performance evaluations. Otherwise, the moments of higher order, especially the 3
rd
 
moment and the 4
th
 moment are necessary in performance measurement. 
 
For a large amount of sample data, the normality test statistic, the normality test statistic 
of JB test follows a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom. The critical 
value depends on the level of significant desired. For most commonly used level of 
significant of 5% and 1%, the critical values are 5.99 and 9.21, respectively.  Note that 
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two critical values are computed in MATLAB using the command x = chi2inv(P, V) 
where P is the level of significance (0.95 or 0.99) and V is the degrees of freedom (V = 
2).  
 
As mentioned, the non-normal returns are usual in the real world. According to Scott and 
Horvath (1980), the moments of high orders should be used to further interpret in the 
risk-return profile if the returns are not approximately normal. There are two assumptions 
before applying moments of higher order. First, the investor's utility function is of higher 
order than the quadratic. Second, the mean value and variance do not completely 
determine the distribution. 
 
If the both of the assumptions are satisfied, we can use the moments of higher order to 
catch the true risk-return performance. As shown in Scott and Horvath (1980), the 
investor‟s utility function can be interpreted in the Taylor series expansion in which the 
first two terms contain the mean and variance as shown as follows: 
  
 
The skewness and kurtosis of the utility function are similar to third and further moments 
of the Taylor series expansion. Scott and Horvath (1980) suggested a sophisticated 
transformation of these moments to explain the extreme returns. The details will be 
covered late in this section. 
 
Skewness, the third central moment of a distribution, is used as a measure of the 
symmetry of a return distribution around its mean. A return distribution with positive 
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skewness has frequent small losses with a few extreme gains. On the other hand, a return 
distribution with negative skewness has frequent small gains and a few large losses.  
 
From the risk-return perspective, rational investors would prefer the distribution with a 
positive skewness to the distribution with a negative skewness. This is because a positive 
skewed distribution has its mean return fallen above the median. Skewness zero means 
the distribution is perfectly symmetrical. One example of skewness zero is standard 
normal distribution. The sample skewness can be computed easily by using command S 
= skewness(X) in MATLAB or S = SKEW(X) in Excel, where X is the data set aligned as 
column vectors. 
 
Kurtosis, the fourth central moment of a distribution, measures the degree of peakedness 
and heaviness of the tails of a distribution. A normal distribution has a kurtosis of three. 
Distribution that is more peaked than normal is called leptokurtic; and a distribution that 
is less peaked than normal is called platykurtic. The leptokurtic distribution has the 
notorious fat-tail effects in the either side of return distribution. The sample kurtosis can 
be computed by using command S = kurtosis(X) in MATLAB or S = KURT(X) + 3 in 
Excel, where X is the data set aligned as column vectors. 
3.4 Transformation of the Moments of Higher Order 
Brulhart and Klein (2006) introduced a sophisticated idea to analyze the true extreme 
returns of investments. The large negative skewness and kurtosis could be led by its small 
standard deviation. Based on this conjecture, the skewness and kurtosis are standardized 
by multiplying s
3
 and s
4
, respectively. The transformed format should provide a deeper 
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insight to the extreme returns. The complete transformation is shown in Table [2]. The 
consistently negative bias for measures of the first four orders of moments decrease as the 
degrees of freedom (DOF) and the sample sizes n increase. 
3.5 Drawdown Statistics 
The drawdown analysis is a straightforward measure. To explain the concepts, we draw a 
graph to demonstrate the idea as showed in Figure [1].  
 
The maximum drawdown, which is also recognized as peak to valley, is the maximum 
loss between the highest point to the lowest point in a certain time horizon. As showed in 
the figure, the loss occurs between point A and point B. The time horizon from point A to 
point B is the drawdown period. Then, the time that point B takes to reach point C is 
called recovery period. Point C is on same level of as the peak point A. In some cases, the 
loss is completely recovered by the end of the inspection. Then, the portion that still to be 
recovered is used as another indicator.  
 
The drawdown measure is easy to understand. However, it is not a perfect measure. 
According to Lhabitant (2004), there are some disadvantages of the drawdown measure. 
First, assuming everything is equal; the magnitude of drawdown is usually greater than 
the fund measured in a short time horizon. The comparisons between the magnitudes of 
drawdown on hedge funds that measured in different time horizons do not provide much 
valuable information. Second, the magnitude of drawdown of hedge fund is severe when 
the time interval is not long enough. Moreover, the different hedge funds should be tested 
under the same time horizon. Third, the maximum drawdown itself is not able to 
  17 
demonstrate a big picture of the performance. For instance, the fund which has a one time 
maximum loss of 10% is better than the fund which has two times maximum losses of 
9% under the same time horizon. The maximum magnitude of drawdown is independent 
from the average loss in this measurement.  Accordingly, we re-calculate the hedge fund 
indices as well as equity and bond indices so that they are measured under the same time 
horizon to make sure they are comparable. 
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4: ANALYSIS OF HEDGE FUND EXTREME RETURNS 
4.1  Data Descriptions 
Due to the nature of hedge fund industry, the fund performances are not easily available 
to the general public.  For this study, we obtained private data from KCS Fund Strategies 
Inc. The database contains 154 individual hedge funds in Canadian market from 
September of 1996 to June of 2008. The overview of Canadian hedge fund market is 
shown in Table [3]. Different from U.S. hedge fund market, the Canadian hedge fund 
market is less efficient and less crowded. These two facts make the Canada hedge fund 
market a profitable one. The other obvious feature is that the Canadian hedge fund 
industry is dominated by three hedge fund strategies, namely Equity Long/Short 
strategies (49.35%), the Managed Futures strategies (12.34%) and the Equity Market 
Neutral strategies (11.04%). These three hedge fund strategies cover over 70% of all 
hedge funds of the database. 
 
The hedge funds in the database can be classified into fourteen different strategies 
groups. The minimum and maximum returns of each strategy in Table [3] are two 
extreme values of an average monthly return in the time period. We noticed that the 
Event Driven hedge fund features both the minimum (-36.6%) and maximum (23.82%) 
returns among all the strategies groups. However, these two extreme returns are 
respectively calculated by one and two individual funds at the corresponding month, 
which can not provide useful comparisons between indices. 
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Following the research methodologies described in Chapter 3, we choose TSX equity 
index and DEX bond index as the benchmarks to compare the risk and return profiles on 
various hedge fund indices. Considering the less-efficient and less-mature hedge fund 
market in Canada, there is no authorized hedge fund index to choose from. In this thesis, 
we choose five major hedge fund strategies based on the criterions that each of the hedge 
fund strategy must have at least four funds during the studied time horizon. After careful 
considerations, we select the time horizon from January 2003 to May 2008. This period is 
relatively free of extreme events so that it well represents the common condition of the 
Canadian market. The last month of the database is not included here because some of the 
data are not available. Thereafter, we are ready to construct the five sub-indices based on 
the selected strategies as well as an overall hedge fund index.   
 
4.2 Performance Comparisons 
The statistical properties of the bond index, the equity index and hedge fund sub-indices 
are shown in Table [4]. Note that the selected equity index and the bond index are 
evaluated in a much longer time horizon due to the relative mature markets of equity and 
bond trading. There are monthly returns of these two indices measured from January of 
1994 to June of 2008.  However, the individual Canadian hedge funds in the database 
started to operate from very different time points, which are generally later than the 
equity and bond indices. The differences between the indices are available in Table [4]. 
We do have some better ideas in mind about the comparisons of indices. We also noticed 
that the significant change of risk and return profile of TSX and DEX that are measured 
in different time horizons.  
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The bond index, the equity index, the overall hedge fund index and four of the five hedge 
fund sub-indices have negative skewness at the studied time horizon. The Event Driven 
hedge fund strategy is an exception. Another finding is that the hypothesis of normality, 
based on Jarque-Bera test values shown in Table [4], cannot be rejected to the bond and 
hedge fund indices at 5% of confidence interval (critical value is 9.21). On the other 
hand, the Jarque-Bera test value of the equity index is slightly greater than the critical 
value. 
 
TSX index, DEX index, the overall index and other five hedge fund sub-indices are 
plotted in Figure [2] with the same scale of vertical and horizontal axis. The histograms 
show that none of the four distributions look normal but the bond index and the overall 
hedge fund index looks more structured and consistent. On the other hand, the equity 
index and the Equity Hedge index look more fractured and spread out. The distribution of 
the equity index and the Equity Hedge index clearly show more negative skewness than 
the other two indices. If we take a close observation, we could notice that TSX index 
experienced a few times of extreme negative events which had over 5% loss.    
 
The Sharpe ratios of the bond index, the equity index and each hedge fund sub-index are 
shown in Table [4]. We retrieved the Canadian 3-month Treasure bill rates from the same 
time horizon, and took them into the database to compute the risk-free interest rate. The 
average rate is 3.17% annually. The monthly mean return and standard deviation are 
annualized to calculate the desired Sharpe ratio. All the hedge fund sub-indices, except 
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the Equity Market Neutral strategy, show a higher Sharpe ratio than that of TSX and 
DEX, The Equity Hedge strategy has the highest Sharpe ratio among the sub-indices.  
As shown in Table [3], there are fourteen hedge fund strategies in the given database. 
Due to the imbalance structure of this database, some hedge fund strategies contain over 
10% of total hedge funds, while others have less than 2%. Considering the situation, we 
follow the selection criterions discussed in the coming paragraph to select the top five of 
the most representative sub-indices which cover the most characteristics of all hedge 
funds in the Canadian market.  
 
The screening standards are based on the following criteria. First, the hedge fund strategy 
groups must have at least four individual hedge funds at any month during the tested time 
period. As shown in Table [3], a few hedge fund strategies have one or two individual 
funds such that the strategy cannot represented by these funds only. Second, the selected 
funds must have minimum 12 monthly returns during the operation. In this case, there are 
eight funds which are not qualified in the database, and they will be screened out during 
the calculations. We initially would like to set some capital requirement, but the lack of 
asset value make this criterion in vain. Hence, the five main sub-indices are defined and 
ready for the further analysis. 
 
The classification of hedge funds in the given database is consistent with the framework 
of Scotia Capital Canadian hedge fund performance index strategy classification. The 
hedge funds can be classified into the groups with high or low market exposure, or other 
words, directional or non-directional. Then, within each investment style (Relative Value, 
  22 
Event Driven and Opportunistic), hedge funds will be further categorized into one of 
fourteen strategy category groupings.   
4.2.1 Considerations of Higher Moments and Drawdown Statistics 
Detailed research data of moments of higher order are provided in Table [5]. The 
common hidden risk factors of hedge funds, skewness and kurtosis, are calculated for 
each strategy group. For the reason of comparisons, the same performance indicators of 
the bond index and equity index are listed in the table as well. The transformed third 
moment and fourth moment should provide deep insight of the real risk-return profile of 
each investment style.  
 
In addition, the research results of drawdown statistics are documented in Table [6], 
which exposes the magnitude and time of maximum drawdown, and length to recovery in 
the studied period. If the index is not recovered from the drawdown yet, another 
indicator, the “still to be recovered” indicator is recorded. To have a straightforward 
understanding to the index performance in the studied time horizon, the moving trends of 
the equity index and the bond index are plotted and shown in Figure [3]. Meanwhile, the 
performance of the overall hedge fund index and other five sub-indices are plotted and 
shown in Figure [4]. 
 
The Overall Hedge Fund Index 
 
The overall hedge fund index is constructed from the given database. Note that eight 
hedge funds that not qualified are screened out during the evaluation. The overall index 
shows a decent mean return and standard deviation, and has a lower kurtosis and higher 
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skewness than that of the bond and equity indices. As shown in Table [4], the overall 
Hedge Fund Index has the highest Sharpe ratio among all indices. However, the index has 
a negative skewness, which is not favourable to investors. 
The analysis of the third moment and the fourth moment  suggest that the overall index 
has more extreme returns than the bond index during the studied period. However, the 
overall index is still much better than the equity index.  
 
The analyses to drawdown statistics are also conducted to the overall hedge fund index. 
The overall index has a maximum drawdown of 3.47% in five months. Fortunately, the 
index quickly recovered in one month. Comparing with the equity index and the bond 
index, the overall hedge fund index has a less severe impact. 
 
Long/Short Equity Strategy 
 
The data in Table [5] indicate that the mean return of the Equity Hedge strategy is greater 
than that of TSX and DEX indices under the same time horizon. The Equity Hedge 
strategy has the advantage of lower standard deviation over TSX index, but losts the 
advantage to DEX bond index.  
 
As for skewness and kurtosis, the Long/Short Equity index has less extreme returns than 
the equity index. The Long/Short Equity has the lowest kurtosis among these three 
indices. However, from the perspective of higher moment analysis, the Equity Hedge 
strategy suffers most from the extreme returns. The research data indicate that the Equity 
hedge strategy has the most negative skewness and highest kurtosis among these three 
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indices. This implies that the return distribution of the Long/Short Equity index shifts to 
right, and has a fat tail on the left side. 
 
The Long/Short Equity index has a worse loss of 5.26% in three months, and the index 
quickly recovered in four months.  
 
Managed Futures Strategy 
 
The Managed Futures hedge fund strategy has a similar mean/variance performance to 
TSX index; the difference is that it has a slightly lower mean return and standard 
deviation. The Managed Futures index shows unfavourable negative skewness and high 
kurtosis. The further analysis of higher moments indicates that the Managed Futures 
hedge fund strategy has more extreme returns than the bond index, but still much better 
than the equity index under the same time horizon. 
 
The analysis of drawdown statistics indicates that the Managed Futures hedge fund 
strategy has a maximum loss of 5.81%, but the loss is lower than the maximum loss of 
the equity index. The index recovered to its previous peak level in three months.   
 
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) Strategy 
 
Due to the nature of the EMN hedge fund strategy, the standard deviation of the Equity 
Market Neutral strategy is relatively small among all hedge fund sub-indices. The 
mean/variance of the Equity Market Neutral strategy is very closed to that of the bond 
index. However, the mean return and standard deviation are slightly lower. As shown in 
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Table [4], the EMN strategy has the lowest Sharpe ratio among the hedge fund sub-
indices.   
 
From the perspective of skewness and kurtosis, the EMN hedge fund strategy has an 
exposure in extreme returns. The return distribution of EMN hedge fund strategy shifts to 
its right ride and has a fat tail on its left side because of the negative skewness. The 
transformation of the third moment and fourth moment reveals the true risk/return profile 
of the EMN hedge fund index. The third moment of the EMN hedge fund strategy is 
much greater than that of the equity index, although the third moment still has a negative 
value. On the other hand, this strategy does not have too many extreme returns based on 
the value of the fourth moment.  
 
Once again, these observations prove that the transformed skewness (the third central 
moment) and kurtosis (the fourth central moment) provide an insightful look at the real 
extreme returns faced by the hedge funds. The small value of standard deviation plays a 
critical role in the analyses of extreme returns of hedge funds.  
 
Among all indices, the EMN hedge fund index has the smallest maximum loss over the 
studied time horizon. It has a 1.96% of maximum loss, which is much better than other 
indices. The index suffered the loss in one month, and recovered in three months. 
 
Multi-Strategy 
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The key performance indicators of the Multi-Strategy Hedge Fund index are shown in 
Table [4] and [5]. Comparing to the equity index, the Multi-Strategy Hedge Fund index 
looks better due to its slightly higher mean return and lower standard deviation. However, 
from the perspective of skewness and kurtosis, the Multi-Strategy Hedge Fund index has 
a worse exposure of extreme returns than the equity index because it has a lower 
skewness and higher kurtosis.  
 
This conclusion is overturned by the further analysis on the higher moments. As shown in 
Table [5], although the third and fourth moments of the Multi-Strategy Hedge Fund index 
is worse than the bond index, these two moments are still better than those of equity 
index. In other words, the hedge fund index has a greater third moment and smaller 
fourth moment than those of the equity index. 
 
Based on the data in the given database, the magnitude of maximum drawdown is 6.60% 
up to May 2008. The Multi-Strategy Hedge Fund index is on the way of recovering. Our 
research indicates that another 21.15% of total drawdown has not recovered yet.   
 
Event Driven Strategy 
 
There is one thing needs to be noticed to the Event Driven hedge fund index: its positive 
skewness. It is the only fund with positive skewness in our studied indices, although the 
Event Driven hedge fund index has a high kurtosis. The analysis on the moments of 
higher order tells another story. The Event Driven hedge fund index has the largest fourth 
moment in all the funds.  
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We do not have the value of the worse loss over the studied time horizon to the Event 
Driven hedge fund index. The index is keep falling until the end of the observation time 
horzion. However, the research indicates that the maximum loss until May of 2008 is 
8.19%. Then, we are not able to document when the index will reach its bottom.  
4.2.2 Extreme Returns Explained So Far  
Table [4], [5] and [6] provide deep thoughts on the analysis of extreme returns in the 
Canadian hedge fund market. The calculations of Sharpe ratio shown in Table [4] suggest 
that hedge fund indices, except the Equity Market Neutral hedge fund index, should be 
more preferable than the bond index and the equity index. The normality tests to all eight 
indices suggest that the overall hedge fund index and other sub-indices have the return 
distributions that are closed to normal in the studied time horizon. However, the 
normality hypothesises to the bond and the equity indices are all rejected.  
 
The risks of extreme returns faced by hedge funds are exaggerated when using skewness 
and kurtosis as the risk indicators. The analysis of moments of higher order reveals the 
true risk/return profile of each index. Generally speaking, hedge fund indices have a 
higher third moment (the exception is the Equity Hedge strategy) and lower kurtosis (the 
exceptions are the Equity Long/Short strategy and the Event Driven strategy) than the 
equity index. The results are demonstrated in Table [5]. 
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As shown in Table [6], the overall hedge fund index and sub-indices generally have 
smaller maximum losses than the equity index. Besides, they are quickly recovered in 
couple of months. 
 
4.2.3 Consideration of De-Levering Method 
 
Equalization of Fourth Moments 
To provide further comparisons among the three indices, we conduct a series of research 
by equalizing certain moments of each index. Hence, the comparison between “apple” 
and “orange” becomes possible. To do so, these three indices still have to be evaluated 
under the same time horizon. 
  
We set the DEX Universe Bond index as the reference index to de-lever the equity index, 
the overall hedge fund index and other five hedge fund sub-indices. Meanwhile, the 3-
month Canadian Treasure-bill rate is used as the risk-free interest rate. We obtained all 
the Treasure-bill rates from Bank of Canada. 
 
The detailed de-levering procedures are as follows. First, the fourth moment of the equity 
index, which is usually much higher than that of Bond index, is set equal to the fourth 
moment of the bond index. The leverage ratio is then defined such that some cents of one 
dollar will be invested in the index and the rest of the dollar will be invested in the 
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riskless asset, in our case, the Canadian Treasure-bill. The other parameters of 
performance follow the classical portfolio theory. 
 
The transformations are conducted to equalize the fourth moment of these indices. The 
results are shown in Table [7]. Under the same fourth moments, the overall hedge fund 
index has the leverage ratio of 0.516, which means 0.516 of one dollar is invested in the 
overall hedge fund index. The rest of one dollar will be invested in the Canadian 3-month 
Treasure bills such that the constructed portfolio will have the equal fourth moment as the 
bond index. In the case of the Managed Futures hedge fund index which has a leverage 
ratio of 1.678, we will short sell 0.678 dollar of the Treasure bills.  
 
The research results indicate that the overall hedge fund index and other hedge fund sub-
indices, with the exception of the Equity Market Neutral hedge fund index, have higher 
returns than the bond index and the equity index. Except the Managed Futures index 
which has a standard deviation of 3.452, other hedge fund indices have standard 
deviations which are close to that of the equity index and the bond index. Bond index is 
the only index which has a negative third moment. The Managed Futures index shows an 
extraordinary high third moment in all the considered indices.  
   
Meanwhile, the drawdown statistics are conducted to the de-levered portfolios which 
have the same amount of fourth moment. Similarly, we reproduce the all the selected 
indices; the results are shown in Table [8]. One interesting observation is that the 
Managed Futures hedge fund index has the worse loss in the studied period, which is 
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many times of the maximum loss of other indices. The data also indicate the index 
recovered in four months. Other than the above fact, the overall hedge fund index and the 
other five sub-indices have lower magnitude of maximum loss than that of the bond and 
equity indices. 
 
 
Equalization of Second Moments 
The research on the equalization of the fourth moments suggests that some hedge fund 
indices suffer less exposures of extreme return than the equity index. However, the 
standard mean/variance measure usually ignores the risks associated with higher 
moments. In this case, we do the research to equalize the second moment of each index, 
and the results are shown in Table [9]. 
 
The second moment of investor‟s utility function refers to the standard deviation of each 
index. The Bond index is still the benchmark index. The research data in the table show 
that the overall hedge fund index achieved the highest return among the studied indices. 
In addition, the returns of hedge fund indices, with the exception of EMN hedge fund 
index, are higher than the equity and bond indices. Another observation is that the fourth 
moment of the bond index is higher than that of the equity index, which is consistent with 
the result of the paper (Brulhart and Klein, 2006). 
 
The drawdown statistics research is also conducted to the de-levered portfolios which 
have same amount of the second moment. The research results are shown in Table [10]. 
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As we expected, these results again prove that the hedge fund indices have less severe 
extreme returns than the bond index and the equity index.  
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5: CONCLUSION 
The research on the comparisons among the bond, equity and hedge fund sub-indices are 
conducted under the same time horizon. The five main hedge fund sub-indices and the 
overall hedge fund index generally have higher mean return and lower standard deviation 
than that of the equity index and bond index over the same time horizon. Some of them 
show negative skewness and high kurtosis. However, taking the transformed third and 
fourth moments into considerations, the extreme returns are not that severe as we ever 
thought.  
 
These hedge fund indices are generally better than the performance of equity index, and 
have a comparable performance with the bond. The only exception is the Long/Short 
Equity hedge fund index which shows a lower negative third moment and a higher 
kurtosis than the equity index. The other is the Event Driven hedge fund index which has 
a higher fourth moment than the equity index. 
 
The drawdown statistics research provides a straightforward measure to the extreme 
returns. As expected, the hedge fund indices have smaller magnitude of maximum 
drawdown than that of equity index. We are not sure about the Event Driven hedge fund 
index because the index is still keep falling down up to the end of the studies time 
horizon. Another finding is that the studied indices have very short time periods of 
drawdown and can recover in a few months.  
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The research is conducted to the given hedge fund database. We expect the results could 
be improved in the future. First, the more individual hedge funds we have in the database, 
the more convincible research results we can get. Comparing with the TASS/Tremont 
database which contains over 3000 hedge funds, the given database contains only 154 
individual hedge funds and is relatively small. A larger database is needed to improve the 
accuracy of the research. Second, considering the short history and less-mature stage of 
Canadian hedge fund market, we expect a longer time horizon which can provide more 
information in the research.  
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Table [1]: The MSCI Hedge Fund Classification Standard (Source: MSCI) 
 
Primary Characteristics  
Investment Process  Geography  
Group Process  Area Region   
Directional 
Trading 
Discretionary 
Trading 
Commodities Developed 
Markets 
Europe GICS Sector Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Energy 
Financials 
Health Care 
Industrials 
 Tactical 
Allocation 
Convertibles  Japan  
 Systematic 
Trading 
Currencies  North 
America 
 
 Multi-Process Equity  Pacific ex 
Japan 
 
Relative 
Value 
Arbitrage Fixed Income  Diversified  
 Merger 
Arbitrage 
Diversified Emerging 
Markets 
EMEA  
 Statistical 
Arbitrage 
  Asia 
Pacific 
 Information 
Technology 
Materials 
Telecom 
Services 
Utilities 
No Industry 
Focus 
 Multi-Process   Latin 
America 
 
Security 
Selection 
Long Bias   Diversified  
 No Bias  Global 
Markets 
Europe  
 Short Bias   Asia ex 
Japan 
 
 Variable Bias   Asia Fixed Income 
Focus 
Asset-Backed 
Specialist 
Credit 
Long-Short 
Credit 
  Diversified  Government 
Sponsored 
 Distressed 
Securities 
    High Yield 
 Private 
Placement 
    Investment 
Grade 
 Multi-Process     Mortgage-
Backed 
Multi-
Process 
Group 
Event Driven     Sovereign 
 Multi-Process     No Fixed 
Income Focus 
     Capitalization 
Size 
Mid and 
Large Cap 
      Small Cap 
      Small and 
Mid Cap 
      No Size Focus 
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Table [2]: The Transformation of Skewness and Kurtosis  
(Source: Brulhart and Klein, (2006)) 
DOF and s in the table stand for Degree of Freedom and Standard deviation, respectively.  
 
 First Moment Second Moment Third Moment Fourth Moment 
Standard 
Formula 
    
Name Mean Variance N/A N/A 
Units Percent Percnet
2
 Percnet
3
 Percnet
4
 
Transformation N/A Square Root 
  
Name Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Units Percent Percent N/A N/A 
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Figure [1]: The Concept of Drawdown Analysis 
We draw a picture to explain the drawdown concepts. Point A is one of historical high point and Point B is 
the valley of the index. In the practical research, we try three drawdown time periods and select the one has 
the maximum loss. Point C is the point where index recover from its previous trough.  
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Table [3]: Canadian Hedge Fund Market Overview 
 
The information is obtained by observing the hedge funds in the given database. The minimum and 
maximum returns are two extreme values of the average monthly returns.  
 
 
 
Number of 
Funds 
Starting 
Period 
Ending 
Period 
Min (%) Max (%) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
3 Jul-98 Jun-08 -5.07 5.45 
Emerging 
Markets 
1 Aug-05 Jun-08 -12.08 12.27 
EMN 17 Jun-99 Jun-08 -8.99 5.75 
L/S Equity 76 Aug-96 Jun-08 -9.51 15.78 
Event Driven 6 Jan-98 Jun-08 -36.6 23.82 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
4 Nov-96 Jun-08 -5.30 7.82 
Managed 
Futures 
19 Jan-97 Jun-08 -8.66 18.94 
Global Macro 9 Dec-01 Jun-08 -8.04 14.43 
Long Only 3 Sep-97 Jun-08 -12.94 23.19 
Merger 
Arbitrage 
1 Jul-02 Jun-08 -9.66 10.47 
Multi-Strategy 11 Feb-98 Jun-08 -15.05 16.62 
Options 1 May-07 Jun-08 -23.90 20.24 
Short Selling 2 Jul-04 Jun-08 -10.21 8.10 
Volatility 1 Jul-07 Jun-08 -0.97 2.64 
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Table [4]: Statistical Properties of Equity and Hedge Fund Indices  
 
The research results are evaluated from January 2003 to May 2008. Equally weights are assigned to each 
individual hedge fund. The risk-free interest rate is computed from the practical Canadian 3-month 
Treasury bill rates. The Sharpe ratio is calculated by using the annualized data. 
 
Index 
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Skew Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
stat 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Canada Equity and Bond Indices 
TSX 1.281 2.958 -0.635 2.712 9.971 1.191 
DEX 0.459 1.007 -0.312 3.539 3.798 0.670 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Overall HF 
Index 
1.463 2.128 -0.271 2.504 1.458 1.952 
Equity 
Long/Short 
1.829 3.164 -0.526 2.474 3.749 1.713 
Managed 
Futures 
1.253 2.054 -0.611 3.282 4.265 1.668 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
0.452 0.990 -0.740 3.788 7.613 0.657 
Event  
Driven 
1.749 3.153 0.079 2.892 0.098 1.631 
Multi –  
Strategy 
1.355 2.427 -0.653 3.292 4.846 1.557 
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Figure [2]: Return Histograms of Different Indices (01/2003 ~ 05/2008) 
The returns histograms for each index are adjusted such that they have the same sale of X- and Y- Axis. 
  
TSX Index DEX Index 
  
Overall Index of Hedge Fund Long/Short Equity 
 
 
Managed Futures EMN 
  
Event Driven  Multi-Strategy 
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Table [5]: Higher Moments of Equity and Hedge Fund Indices 
 
These values are calculated based on monthly data provided in the database. In the calculation, the third 
moment can be calculated by multiplying skewness and the standard deviation of power of 3. The fourth 
moment can be calculated by multiplying kurtosis and the standdeviation of power of 4.  
 
 
 
Index 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Skew Kurtosis 
Third 
Moment 
(%
3
) 
Fourth 
Moment 
(%
4
) 
Canada Equity and Bond Indices 
TSX 2.958 -0.635 2.712 -16.441 207.599 
DEX 1.007 -0.312 3.539 -0.318 3.636 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Overall HF 
Index 
2.128 -0.271 2.504 -2.609 51.391 
Equity 
Long/Short 
3.164 -0.526 2.474 -16.671 248.013 
Managed 
Futures 
2.054 -0.611 3.282 -5.300 58.443 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
0.990 -0.740 3.788 -0.719 3.645 
Event  
Driven 
3.153 0.079 2.892 2.461 285.818 
Multi –  
Strategy 
2.427 -0.653 3.292 -9.331 114.237 
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Table [6]: Peak to Trough Drawdowns and Recovery Times 
 
We first reproduce the indices in the selected time period. The peak to tough drawdown is defined by from 
the historical high point to its valley. The length of drawdown is counted from the highest point to lowest 
point. If the index is recovered from its trought, the time to recovery is documented. If not, the portion not 
covered yet will be calculated. All the results calculated are based on monthly values. 
 
Index 
Peak to 
Trough 
Drawdown 
(%) 
Length of 
Drawdown 
(Months) 
Time to 
Recovery 
(Months) 
Still to be 
Recovered 
(%) 
Canada Equity and Bond Indices 
TSX -10.041% 3 4 N/A 
DEX -2.690% 2 3 N/A 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Overall HF 
Index 
-3.466% 5 1 N/A 
Equity 
Long/Short 
-5.258% 3 4 N/A 
Managed 
Futures 
-5.813% 3 3 N/A 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
-1.959% 1 3 N/A 
Event  
Driven 
-8.188% 3 0* 100.000% 
Multi –  
Strategy 
-6.604% 3 4* 21.245% 
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Figure [3]: The Performances of TSX and DEX (01/2003 ~ 05/2008) 
 
  
TSX (the Equity Index) DEX (the Bond Index) 
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Figure [4]: Performances of Hedge Fund Indices (01/2003 ~ 05/2008) 
 
  
Overall HF Index* Long/Short Equity Index 
  
Event Driven Index Managed Futures Index 
  
EMN Index Multi-Strategy Index 
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Table [7]: De-Levering to Match Fourth Moments 
 
The complete calculation procedures are covered in the thesis. The risk-free interest rates are calculated 
from Canadian 3-month Treasury bill rate.  
 
Index Leverage 
Average 
Return 
 (%) 
Standard 
Deviation  
(%) 
Third 
Moment 
 (%
3
) 
Canada Equity and Bond Indices 
TSX 0.364 0.634 1.074 2.931 
DEX 1.000 0.459 1.007 -0.318 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Overall HF 
Index 
0.516 0.883 1.100 3.618 
Equity 
Long/Short 
0.348 0.809 1.104 3.772 
Managed 
Futures 
1.678 1.924 3.452 98.731 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
0.999 0.452 0.990 2.192 
Event  
Driven 
0.336 0.763 1.072 2.788 
Multi –  
Strategy 
0.422 0.725 1.025 2.532 
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Table [8]: Peak to Trough Drawdown of De-Levered Portfolios (4
th
 Moment was 
Equalized) 
All the indices are evaluated in the time period from Jan 2003 to May 2008. The 3-month Canadian 
Treasury Bill are retrieved from Bank of Canada. The research based on the previous calculations which 
are equalized the fourth moments of all portfolios. 
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Table [9]: De-Levering to Match Second Moments 
 
The complete calculation procedures are covered in the thesis. The risk-free interest rate are calculated 
from Canadian 3-month Treasury bill rate.  
 
Index Leverage 
Average 
Return 
 (%) 
Third 
Moment 
 (%
3
) 
Fourth 
Moment 
 (%
4
) 
Canada Equity and Bond Indices 
TSX 0.340 0.610 -0.645 2.754 
DEX 1.000 0.459 -0.318 3.636 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Overall HF 
Index 
0.473 0.832 -0.289 2.596 
Equity 
Long/Short 
0.318 0.762 -0.201 2.536 
Managed 
Futures 
0.490 0.749 -0.649 3.377 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
1.017 0.456 -0.756 3.900 
Event  
Driven 
0.319 0.738 0.083 3.108 
Multi –  
Strategy 
0.415 0.717 -0.664 3.326 
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Table [10]: Peak to Trough Drawdown of De-Levered Portfolios (4
th
 Moment was 
Equalized) 
All the indices are evaluated in the time period from Jan 2003 to May 2008. The 3-month Canadian 
Treasury Bill are retrieved from Bank of Canada. The research based on the previous calculations which 
are equalized the fourth moments of all portfolios. 
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